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This paper will present a model of occupational choice in which the
agents are uncertain about their wage within the occupation. Agents are
assumed to know their own stock of human capital and the distribution of
wages per unit of human capital in the occupation at the time of initial
labor market entry. The agents decide which occupation to select based on
their expected utility from each occupation, given the tastes for future
consumption, the available stock of human capital, the tastes for the
occupation, the costs of entry into the occupation, the assets available for
consumption, the tastes for risk, and the distribution of wages within each
occupation. By specifying the form of the utility function, we can derive
estimable equations relating the probability of choosing an occupation, i,
to the moments of the distribution of wages and the past accumulations of
human capital. By imposing appropriate restrictions on the parameters of
the model, both within equations and across equations, all the parameters of
the structural model underlying the occupational choice may be derived.
An empirically estimable occupational choice equation is derived
directly from the theoretical model. This equation is estimated using an
interesting and unique data set which summarizes the occupational choice of
high school graduates in each of the 23 county-level school districts iii
Maryland annually from 1951 through 1969, In addition to occupational
choice, these data provide information on county school c^racteristics and
on the wealth of the county population. Data on the wage distribution by
occupation are compiled by the U,S, Bureau of the Census for the nation.
Preliminary regression results are reported in the last two sections of this
paper.
I. Previous Research
There are two majot categories of research papers which relate to
occupational choice: (1) studies which try to explain occupational choice
using statistical "logit models" , and (2) studies which are primarily con
cerned with the impact of intermittent work by women on female occupational
choice - and often use "logit" methods.
Two papers by Schmidt and Strauss [1975] and Boskin [1974] attempt to
explain occupational choice using "logit models". Schmidt and Strauss use a
largely descriptive approach in explaining worker choice among five occupa
tional groups. Their explanatory variables are educational attainment, work
experience, race, and sex which are introduced with little theoretical
foundation. One might question whether education and work experience truly
are exogenous variables or whether they are choice variables (along with
occupational choice). They conclude that there are substantial differences
between the sexes and races using the 1960 and 1970 Public Use Samples and
the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity.
Boskin provides a better theoretical foundation. He argues that people
will invest in an occupation if the benefits exceed the costs. He notes
that imperfect capital markets may alter one's investment decision. In his
empirical work, the probability of entering one of eleven occupations
depends on the present value of lifetime earnings, the ratio of training
costs to household wealth (the "financing" variable), and the present value
of expected losses of income due to unemployment in the occupation. He
finds the expected signs (lifetime earnings is positive while the other two
variables are negative) but concludes that magnitudes and significance -vary
substantially by race.
Like Boskin, we 'consider the level of earnings in an occupation. But
whereas Boskin assumes that wages are received• with certainty, we assume
that there is uncertainty - a person does not know if he will end up above,
equal to, or below the mean of the occuption's distribution.
,A second set of pap>ers has focused on the intermittent work life of
females. Polachek [1981'] has been a leading advocate of the idea that women
are less likely to enter occupations which have a large payoff to stable and
continuous participation. Like Boskin, Polachek builds a human capital
foundation. He assumes that people maximize lifetime income which equals
years in the labor force times the rental rate on human capital times the
lifetime amount of human capital. Human capital is viewed as being hetero
geneous and varies with years of schooling and with years out of the labor
force.
Like Schmidt and Strauss, Polachek estimates a multiple logit model.
Choice among eight occupational categories are explained in terms of marital
status, years.of schooling, potential lifetime working years, and home work
years,. ' He finds that women having more home work years are less likely to
enter professional and managerial occupations, as compared to other occupa
tional groups (for which continuous work is presumably less important). • It
should be noted that McDowell [1982] and Polachek [1978] have published
related studies on the impact of intermittent work on the selection of
college major.
Intermittent work is a less important phenomenon for males as compared
to females* Since this paper focuses on male occupational choice,
Polachek's work is of less relevance. However, if we study females in the
future, we must surely consider these effects.
II. The Model
To begin, we assume that Individuals live for two periods. In the
first period, an individual accumulates himan capital by investing time in
schooling, nonschool training, or both. The production of human capital is
characterized as
(1) hj = +hj(l-ip +h^CAj,)
where h^^ is human capital produced in period 1, h® is human capital produced
in school, is the proportion of time invested in a school of quality
h^ is human capital from non—school training, and h^ is human capital
produced in the household which is a function of household wealth, .
Normalizing total time at 1, we assume that all period 1 time is divided
between schooling or working, where working is considered nonschool
training. Leisure time is exogenous. Letting L^ be hours of work in period
1, we have 1^ + Lj^ => 1 so that = 1 Household wealth is assumed to
be equally productive, whether the individual is in school or out of
school.
Utility depends upon consumption in periods 1 and 2. The agent's prob
lem is to maximize lifetime utility
(2) E(U) = e{u[C^,C2]
where is equal consumption In period 1, subject to (1) and the lifetime
budget constraint
A. + W (l-I ) - C
^ ^ + W^.h - = 0
p 21 1 2
where p is the discount factor, Is the wage faced by the individual in
period 1y assumed to be an unskilled wage, and is the earnings per unit
of human capital in period 2 in occupation 1, Period 2 consumption will be
a function of available assets and earned income, so that
A. + W.(l-I,) - C,
(3) =-! y-i ^
Substituting (3) into (2), we can write the period 1 maximization problem
as
(4) max E\U
A^ +
* p ^21^1
with respect to the decision variables C^and
]
In period 2, however, and are fixed at their period 1 optimal
levels and . If we also assume utility is additively separable in
and the period 2 maximization problem may be written
(5) maximize Uj(Cj^) + e{U2^(Y^ + hjL^2i^ ^ '
Ai+W^(l-I*)-C*,
1 " P
where and are Independent functions, U2^ being the utility obtained
from choosing occupation 1, Maximizing utility requires choosing occupation
1 so as to maximize the second term of (5), regardless of the optimum levels
* A
of Ij and Cj chosen in period !• We can therefore concentrate on the choice
process underlying the maximization of the second term in (5).
We also allow the human capital produced in period 1 to vary by
occupation* Thus, the knowledge obtained in period 1 may have occupation-
specific as well as general components. Designating the occupation 1
specific himan capital as h^, the objective becomes to select occupation 1.
A Aso as to maximize £{112^(7^ + ^i^2i^ ^ across all occupations.
We specify the expected utility in period 2 for occupation i as
(6) E(U2i) =E[a^ 7 3exp(--Yh*W2^- Y*)]
where is a taste par^eter for occupation i, 3 is a taste parameter, for
period 2 consumption, and Yis a measure of absolute risk aversion.^ Both 3
* *
and Yare assumed to be positive, ^ents know with certainty, and so Y^
is not interacted with the risk-aversion parameter. On the other hand,
*
is stochastic, meaning that the allocation of the human capital stock h^ to
2
occupation i will be subject to risk-averse behavior.
A '
Because Y^ is known with certainty and will be equal across all
occupational choices, and because is a known parameter (to the
individual), we may write (6) as
(7) E(U2^) = ct^ +E[-3^exp(-Yh*W2^)l
where 3^ = 3exp(-Y*) .
Taking the MacLaurin series expansion about lii the stochastic part
3
of (7) , and assuming the distribution of W2^ has at least mmoments, we may
approximate the expected utility of selecting occupation i as
f . r r *-i ^^^2i \ *\2(8) E(U2i) = + E(W2^)(-YhJ + (-Yh^) +
(-Yh;r+...Ej
•» .
k=l
where is an error term representing the difference between our
approximation and the actual expected utility.^
Notice that in this formulation, the mean of the distribution of wages
per unit of human capital serves to increase expected utility of selecting
occupation 1. The second moment of the distribution decreases expected
utility. A positive (negative) third moment of the distribution increases
(decreases) expected utility, and so on.
The agent wants to pick the occupation 1 which will maximize his
expected utility in period 2. Thus, the probability of choosing occupation
i over occupation j, may be written - Pr[E(U2^) >E(U2j) ]• Since is
deterministic and equal across all occupations, this can be rewritten as
« Pr
•E(U2i) ^E(U2^-
or
1
3
1
(9) Pr
1
6,
1
C t-*
^ )
k!
m
Z
k-1
•rl-ThiJ
kl
E(W^^)
> +5j)j
If we also assume that the occupation-specific approximation errors and
^ have Independent Welbull distributions,^ (9) may be written
exp[E(U2^) - i^]
(10) P
n
)](exp(E(U2.) - Cj
j-1
where n is the number of available occupations.
We can thus write a system of estimable equations for occupations 1, 2,
• • n-l, such that
(U) log(^) = E-t/- E(W^J + g—
n k"! 1
for 1 " 1, 2,» . n-1. Equation (U) shows that the log of the odds of
choosing occupation i over occupation n is a function of the differences
between the first through moments of the wage distributions for occupa
tions i and n and the difference in taste between the occupations 1 and- n.
While individuals know the taste parameters and a^. they are not
known by the econometriclan. To obtain an estimable version of (11), we
assume that the utility obtained by selecting occupation 1 over occupation n
varies over time. We decompose the taste parameters into two components so
that + ^i» ^1 preference for occupation
1 over occupation n, and is some time-specific positive or negative
increment In the taste for occupation 1 over occupation n. We can thus
rewrite (11) as
n k=l
P. m
(ID log [-f] - S + ei + ei
If h* and the moments of the distribution of wages per unit of human capital
may be observed empirically, the structural parameter "Y may be identified
from the restrictions implied by (IT). To see this, suppose that only the
first two moments of each wage distribution exists, and let represent the
first moment of the wage distribution for occupation i and represent the
second moment of the wage distribution for occupation 1. (11') becomes:
(12) log (^) =a^(h*y^ - h*P^) - \ +"^1
n
Where a^^ - T
32 =Y^/2
Obviously, T Is overldentlfied In this system. Notice that as higher
moments of the distribution of wages are added to (12), Y becomes even more
overldentlfied•
Unfortunately, the stock of human capital is not observed directly.
However, inputs into the production of human capital (school quality, school
attendence and family assets) are observable. Thus, we can impose a human
capital production function of the form
(13) = 60, +
where as before, is a vector of school characteristics, is proportion
of time invested in school and A^is a vector of relevant family assets.
Provided h^ is linear in parameters, the production function may contain any
nimbeT of Interaction terms and quadratic forms of the inputs, so that the
production function can be quite general.^
Inserting (13) into (12), we have
(U) log(^) - -H
+ -- [[«oi + «2i^^ ("P
A
- IiS, + 6. A.) fa }] + €, + e,^ On In 1 1 2n 1-^ ^ n-'-' i i
Whose estimable form is
(15) log(J:} . (b^+ - (b^+ bjI^S^ +bg
n
- (by + bg(lj^Sj^) + bg[Aj,) + ^lO^^l^l^ ^11^1
10
" ^^01 ^10 " " ^1^2
^2 " ^ ^11 ^ ^Oi^2i " ^1^3
bg =Y62i ^12 " ^^^li'^ 2i " ^2^3
\=^«0n ^3 = =."4/2
b3 = , „ b^, =yh\j2 =b^/Z
b6 = "15 = =''I"
"7 = =bl/2 b^g = ="a'-S
>'8 = =^2'^ •'l? =^^^On®2n =
bg =yhl^/2 =hl/2 b^g =^^«l„«2n =''S '^e
Because of the nonlinear dependence between these restrictions, we have
only 6 independent equations in 7 structural parameters. Furthermoreeven
if the number of moments of the wage distribution were to be increased, we
would not obtain additional identifying restrictions. In order to identify
the structural parameters, y, 6q^, 52i» "^On' ^In '^ 2n*
obtain one additional restriction. We propose fixing Y, since we know it
must be positive, and since changing its value scales the production
parameters up or down by the same factor. Once Y is set to some value Y> we,
can identify all other parameters in the model. Notice that because the
production parameters can be obtained from one occupational choice equation,
the model allows inferences to be drawn on the effects of school quality and
household wealth on the productivity of human capital within a given
occupation. Thus, we may test for the equality of production parameters,
, across all occupations, j = 1, ..., n. The results will show if human
11 -
capital is equally valuable in all occupations or if general training Is
more valuable in some occupations than others.
III. Empirical Strategies
The relevant distribution of wages within an occupation will undoubt
edly differ across individuals because of differences in human capital
accumulation in period 1. Unfortunately, we do not observe different
distributions of wages for individuals, only a distribution of wages for the
entire occupation. It is important, therefore, to derive individual wage
distributions from available information on the national market for labor
within the occupation and the characteristics of the individual's human
capital investment.
We begin by assuming that the distribution of earnings per unit of
human captial within an occupation is independent of the distribution of
human capital within the occupation. This assumption is equivalent to one
in which returns per asset are Independent of the distribution of asset
holdings among individuals. Mathematically, our independence assumption
implies
(16) fCW^.h) «
where we have dropped the subscript 1 for ease of exposition. (16) shows
that the joint density function of wages per unit of human capital and human
capital in an occupation is equal to the product of the marginal densities
of and h. This property implies that for an individual with human
capital stock h, the conditional distribution of wages per unit of human
captial is
12
(17) f(wjh) - f,(W )
80 that the distribution of wages per unit of human capital for any indivi
dual is the same, regardless of the individual's holding of human capital.
This property allows us to characterize the individual's period 2 earnings
as Hw^, the formulation imposed in the analysis above.
The assumption of independent density functions for and h also
allows a convenient transformation of available data to arrive at estimates
of the moments of the distribution for W2. We observe the distribution of
hW in an occupation. Provided the distributions of W and h have moment
2 ^
generating functions, the Joint density of and h is
(18) MCW^.h) - M{W2,0)M(0,h)'
This Implies that
\,h
(20)
h
where is the first moment, and is the second moment of the variable j
Thus, if we can obtain the distribution of human capital within an
occupation as well as the Joint distribution of human capital and earnings
per unit of human capital in the occupation, we may derive the moments of
the distribution function for W^.
The empirical constraint is that we would like to have data on and
0 , but they are not directly available. We do have data on the right-
"2
hand*>side variables of equations 19-20• In order to estimate r and a ,
"2 2
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we take logarithms of equations 19~20 and rearrange. For example, from
equation 19 we get:
This form suggests estimating y,. as the anti-logarithm of the residuals
• "2
from a regression of In on In The empirical implementation of
this strategy is discussed more fully in the next section.
Thus far, we have treated period two as a single year. In actuality,
period two should be composed of T subperiods, where T is the length of time
in the workforce. The relevant moments of the earnings distribution will no
longer be only the current moments, but the expected path of future moments
as well.
Let y, and a- be, respectively, the first and second moments of the
^t ^t
distribution of earnings per unit of human capital in period t. Further
more, let y., and o both be stationary stochastic processes. Finally, we
assume that the laws of motion for the distribution of earnings per unit of
human capital are autoregressive processes such that
\ ^ «2\_, ^ ^ ^
I
X •'i\., • Vv, • - *Vv/
which can be rewritten
o(L)n^ =V^, a(L) = 1 - a^L - - ... -
«(L)a, = V° 6(L) = 1 - S,L - 6 - ... - 6Wj. t • 12 p
where L is the lag operator.
uWe assume that the relevant measure of the period 2 first and second
g
movements is the discounted sum of current and expected future moments.
Thus, following Hanaen and Sargent (1980), we can write the first and second
9
moments for period 2 as
T
w.
z (t'e.Cil, ) - I
2 j-0 ''t+j j-0
T T
E p^E (a ) « I (?
j-0 ^ "t+j j-0
V
where Ej.(o) is the expectation operator conditional on information at time
t, and [o]^ Is the anihilatlon operator,^^ In this manner, the agent's
occupational choice can be formulated to depend not only on the current
moments of the distribution of earnings in all occuaptions, but also on the
rational forecasts of the future distributions of earnings in all
occupations.
15
IV. DATA
The empirical portion of this study utilizes a unique and rich source
of data. Each year between 1947 and 1969 the Maryland State Board of
Education has published data on the number of high school graduates broken
down by their major type' of activity in the year following graduation. The
data indicate the proportion who continued their education as well as the
proportion who took jobs (broken down by occupational group).
The data are also rich in that they are available by sex and by county-
level school district. Differences among 23 counties together with changes
over time should create sufficient variation to allow us to estimate the
parameters of our own model. Separate data for boys allows us to abstract
from the complications which intermittent work time may cause in a study of
female occupational choice.
The Maryland survey categorized male workers into six broad occupa
tional groups
(1) Farming, fishing, and lumbering
' (2) Operatives and laborers
(3) Service workers
(4) Craftsmen
(5) Clerical and sales
(6) Professionals and managers
These are the six occupational categories used in this study. Although
slightly fewer groups are available to us as compared to Boskin and
Polachek, our six categories span the universe and appear to be aggregated
into reasonably homogeneous sets.
16
The Maryland State Board of Education provides several consistent
series of school quality measures such as expenditures on teacher salaries,
number and certification levels of teachers, textbooks and other instruc-
t
tional materialsj and size of school enrollment. Average attendance figures
are also available by school district. The measure of school quality used
in this study is real instructional salaries per student enrolled, weighted
by a school utilization ratio. To be more specific, we divided "Salaries
and Wages for•Instruction at the Secondary Level" by the number of students
12
belonging (enrolled) to the school district and then expressed it in real
dollars using the Consumer Price Index. This value was multiplied by a
measure of the extent ,to which students utilize the schools (the ratio of
students attending to students belonging). In order to take account of the
fact that a student's schooling investment occurred over several years, a
six-year moving average was computed. This variable was used as our proxy
for "IS".
A measure of average county assets is also available from the Maryland
State Board of Education. The Board reports the value of property which is
assessable for tax purposes by county level school district. As with the
school quality variable, we compute a six-year moving average of real
property values per capita (deflating by the Consumer Price Index and by the
total county population as interpolated from the Decennial Census of
Population). This is pur proxy for "A^".
Data on the earnings distribution by occupation are not available for
individuals in Maryland. As a result, we were forced to use national income
data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census [Series P-60]. Income distributions
by discrete intervals have been published annually for males by major
17
13 ...occupation. From these distributions, we estimated the annual mean and
'the-.second moment of income (each expressed in real terms) for each of our
.. " \ . 1 14
SIX occupational groupings.
Unfortunately, these Census Bureau data do not hold constant the level
of educational attainment within an occupation. As a consequence, an
increase in the proportion who are college educated will tend to alter the
published distribution of income, even though high school graduates taking
jobs may have experienced no change in their actual income distribution.
Ideally, we would like to purge the data of such changes in educational
attainment. Fortunately, data have been available, since the early 19508.on
educational attainment (from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) v^ich
allow us to attempt some adjustments. Using these data, we computed the
mean, variance, and skewness of educational attainment of males by occupa
tion 1951-1970.^^
The method of purging the income distribution data of educational
attainment effects was motivated by the analysis in the previous section.
Equation 21 suggests regressing the logarithm of income on the logarithm of
education, for each moment of their respective distributions. The anti-
logarithm of the residuals from such a regression should yield the corre
sponding income moment purged of the education effect. This, in fact, was
done for each of the six occupational groups,although we modified the
regression equation slightly by including an intercept. An intercept was
included in order to account for other variables which determine income
levels. In addition to education, age (or experience) is a major determi
nant of income. Since the age distribution within an occupation is expected
18
Co change slowly, if at all, we simply treat it as a constant in our
17
regression.
This procedure yielded six time series, each of which varied around a
mean of 1.0. The next step was to incorporate information about the
relative magnitudes of income moments between occupations. Fortunately,
distributions of male income for each occupation group were broken down by
the level of educational attainment in the 1960 and the 1970 Census of
Population. We computed the 1960 mean and variance of income for each
occupation for males age 25—64 having exactly four years of high school
education. Professionals/managers having the highest values were set equal
to 1.0 in 1959. The ratio of each occupation to professionals/managers
defines that occupation's relative mean or variance in 1959. A consistent
time series was then constructed by multiplying this 1959 "relative" by the
anti-log of the residuals for each series.
This procedure created several time series 1951-1969 which were devoid
of any long-term trends in occupational means of variances. The next step
was to build any such trends back into the data.
This was easily done for the 1959-1969 period since the Census of
Population income distributions for high school graduates were published for
both 1959 and 1969 incomes. We simply compared the 1959 and 1969 values and
18
built that trend into the data. Unfortunately, similar data disaggregated
jointly by education and occupation were not published in the 1950 Census.
In order to build in the 1950-1959 trend, we were forced to use a different
procedure. In essence, the ratio of the income moment to the educational
attainment moment was computed from each of the 1950, 1960, and 1970
Censuses of Population. After verifying that changes in these ratios
19
1959-1969 compared favorably to the "true" changes 1959-1969, we computed
the 1950-1960 changes and used these to build in trends for the years 1951-
1959.
The final step was to construct weighted averages of the occupational
income series which better approximate the expectations of the agents.# Two
methods were used. First, a simple two-year moving average was computed.
High school graduates in 1951, for instance, are observed in their
occupational pursuits in fall 1951 and spring 1952. Hence, we felt that the
appropriate income data should be an average of the 1951 and 1952 calendar-
year values. These final constructed series are plotted in Figures 1 and 2
in the Appendix. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients are
also reported in the appendix. Not surprising are the relatively high
correlations among the occupational means. Only the pattern for farmers
'varies substantially from the other occupational means. There is, of
course, more year-to-year and short-term variation among the groups, "pie
correlations among the occupational variances are not as high.
The second method was to compute the present value of current and
expected future moments as discussed. Initially, we computed first, second,
and third-order autoregressive regressions for each of the occupational
income time series. In a majority of cases, we did find evidence of a
second-order autoregressive process, but we found no evidence of a third-
order process. As shown in footnote 9, by imposing a second order auto
regressive process, the present value of the expected path of a variable y
converges to:
0C2P
2 "t ^ — \-il-poj^-p 1-poCj-p
20
where p is Che discount factor (set equal to .9), and and are the
• .19
autoregressive parameters computed from a regression.
V. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS
Initially equation 15 was estimated separately for each occupation
using ordinary least squares. This was done in order to hold down initial
estimation costs and in order to consider the partial impacts of the
explanatory variables. . In the next section, nonlinear estimation methods
are used in order to compute the structural parameters of equation 15.
The farmer/farm^laborer category was used as the reference group
because there were virtually no counties or years in which there were no
male farm workers. This was computationally 'convenient because we did not
then have to worry about dividing by zero.^^ The dependent variable was
computed as the logarithm of the number in an occupation divided by the
numbers of farmers. The problem of taking the log of zero still remained in
some instances. In such cases, we set the numerator's zero value equal to
0.1.
In order to reduce the problem of collinearity, a modified form of
equation 15 was estimated. Corresponding parameters were constrained to be
equal (i.e., b^=b^; b2=b5; bg^b^; etc.) so that regressions were run
on (u.-p ) and (a.-a ) as well as their interaction terms with "IiS." and
1 n 1 n ^ ^
"A^", for each occupational group i.
An initial attempt was made to estimate equation 15 utilizing measures
of skewness in addition to the mean and variance. This did not work well,
so that the skewness variable and interaction terms were discarded. There
21
are several possible reasons for this poor performance. First, the measure
of skewness which we used is itself a function of the mean and of the
(square root of the) variance. The moments ar? not independent. Second, we
h^ considerable difficulty adjusting our income skewness measure for
changes in the skewness, of educational attainment (see footnote 16). The
data are not as consistent or as reliable as for the mean and variance.
Third, estimation of higher moments is more subject to noise and peculiari
ties in the data when such moments must be estimated from categorical data.
The problem is that only a relatively small number of income intervals (15-
17) are provided each year. Fourth, the introduction of skewness adds nine
interaction terms associated with assets and school quality. Because these
two variables are themselves fairly highly correlated (and highly correlated
with their squares, cubes and cross products), we simply get too much
collinearity in such a regression. (See the appendix for the correlation
coefficients.)
One additional modification was made to equation 15. A set of county
dummy variables was added in order to control for county specific effects.
These control for differences in the distribution of individuals (their
tastes and families' backgrounds) between counties. Of course, such dummy
variables also control for county differences in school quality and in
assets. This may reduce the ability of our school quality (IS) and asset
(A) variables to explain the cross-county variation in occupational choice.
Nevertheless, we felt that the dummy variables controlled for several
important effects for which we had no suitable proxy variables.
22
Tables I-III present our estimates using the simple two-year averages
of the occupational income series. After discussing these results,
Tables IV-VI replicate the first set of tables substituting the Hansen-
Sargent weighted average series for the simple averages.
Table I reports our regression estimates of equation 15• Estimates
were made using data over the 19-year period 1951-1969 and over the 23
Maryland counties for a total of 434 observations. The least squares
2
results are quite good in general, with R s varying between ,54 and .71.
Magnitudes of the regression coefficients and associated t-statistics are
given at the top of the table. Although theory does not require that these
individual coefficients have any necessary signs or magnitudes, it Is
interesting to note that they are reasonably consistent across equations
(professional/managers differ the most).
Of greater interest are the summary statistics below the dashed line.
We expect that an increase in mean own occupational income relative to farm
ing income should increase the likelihood of being in that occupation. The
slope with respect to is positive as expected in all cases and is
statistically significant for professional/managers and clerical/sales.
The results for the occupational variances are not quite as good. We
expect that an increase in the variance of own occupational wage per unit of
human capital relative to farming wages should increase uncertainty and
decrease the likelihood of being in the occupation. This was only true for
three occupations, and of those, only the professional/manager slope is
significantly different from zero. For the other four occupations, the
variance slopes could reasonably be considered to be zero. Although
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TABLE I
Professionals Clerical Operatives
and and and
Managers Sales Craftsmen Laborers Service
(Pi-V 13.07 -6.20 -9.93 -12.21 -15.60
(1.90) (1.27) (1.81) (2.33)* (1.52)
(IS)*(n,-Pp) -.057 .035 -040 .041 .085
(2.35)* (2.31)* (2.58)* (2.08)* (1.65)
A*( U^-Wp) 4.63 • .54 1.19 .88 -.65
(2.56)* (.54) (1.03) (.62) . (.15)
( -2.40 3.59 14.11 15.64 16-47
X £
(1.06) (.56) (2.36)* (3.43)* (2.43)*
(IS)*(aj^-Op) -.022 -.029 -.064 -.107 -.097
(1.61) (.67) (1.68) (4.03)* (2.36)*
(IS)2*(o.-Oj,) .9x10"^ .6x10"^ . .6x10"^ 1.7x10"^ 1.5il0"^
X . «
(1-76) (-73) (.84) (3.46) (2';i8)*
A*(a.-a„) .67 -.34 -2.40 1.61 -.38
X X
(-99) (.17) (1.12) (.98) (.12)
a2*( a a ) -.46 .26 .19 .019 -35
X r
(1.58) (.89) (.72) (.11) (1.46)
(IS)*A*(a.-a_) .0015 -.0029 .0045 -.0048 -.0065
X B
(.26) (.39) (.67) (1.14) (1.04)
County Dummies Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
(F-statietlc) (20.56)* (36.13)* (18.66)* (21.89)* (17.08)*
r2 .618 .706 .616 .616 .537
Summary Statistics:
3Y
Mj.;
3Y
vv
3Y
"3S
3Y
aCTs;
9.66 4.02 • 3.04 .16 4.32
(3.44)* (1.87)* (1-07) (-07) (1.10)
-2.25 -.40 .63 1-06 -.26
(2.77)* (.39) (.51) (-99) (.16)
-94 .13 .15 .05 .16
(2.86)* (.76) (.68) (.25) (.62)
.0004 .0057 .0065 .0063 .004!
(.12) (3.09)* (2.43)* (2.51)* (1.55)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* significant at 5% level
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TABLE II
' Professionals
and
Managers
Clerical
and
Sales Craftsmen
Operatives
and
Laborers Service
(Wl-Wp) 13.25
(1.94)
-6.16
(1.29)
-10.25
(1.89)
-12.45
(2-41)*
-11.96
(i;i8)
(IS)*( WiTUp) -.016
(.87)
.040
(3-41)*
-052
(4.37)*
.050 •
(3.40)*
:063
(1.89)
(Ol-Op) -2.26
(1.00) •
3.59
(.58)
14.69
(2.48)*
15.82
(3.50)*
13.97
(2.09)*
(IS)*(Oi-ap) -.016
,(1.36)
-.032
(.89)
-.089
(2.86)*
-.093
(4-28)*
-.086
(2.81)*
(IS)2*((jj^-ap) .6x10"^
'(2.10)*
.6x10'^
(1.10)
1.2x10"^
(2.86)*
1.3x10'^
(4.41)*
1.1x10"^
(2.89)*
County Diimmles
(F-statlstlc)
Inc.
(21.60)*
Inc.
(38.94)*
Inc.
(22.25)*
Inc.
(22.76)*
Inc.
(16.97)*
.608 .704 .613 .612 .529
Siteary Statistics:
3Y.
acUi"Mp)
3Y
a^-ap)
3Y
9.19
(3.25)*
-2.10
(2.58)*
.0072
(4.16)*
(t-'statlstlcs in parentheses)
* significant at 5% level
4.08
(1.93)*
-.38
(.38)
.0069
(5.76)*
2.90
(1.02)
.76
(.62)
.0077
(3.83)*
.28
(.12)
1.06
(1.00)
.0070
(3.35)*
16.04
(1.89)*
^-.36
(.22)
.0054
(2.04)*
25
•* TABLE III
Professionals Clerical Operatives
and and and
Managers Sales Craftsmen Laborers Service
( Ml" Mp) -.57 -2.85 3.08 .39 -1.69
(.12) (1.30) (1.02) (.12) (.24)
A*( Mi-Pp) 2.98 2.96 2.50 2.55 3.31
(2.25)* (4.62)* (3.13)* (2.36)* (1.24)
-1.52 .90 1.36 -.08 5.40
(1.07) (.46) (.60) (.04) (1.63)
A*(Oj^-ap),, .21 -1.82 -2.81 -1.50 -4.57
(.37) (1.42) (2.08)* (1.45) (2.69)*
A2*(<J.-ap) -.15 .37 .47 .24 .57
(1.13) (1.72) (2.19)* (1.59) (2.64)*
County Dummies Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
(F-statistlc) (21.20)* (35.48)* (18.72)* (20.91)* (17.02)*
.607 .697 .607 .598 .528
Summary Statistics:
3Y
3C V^-lip)
vv
8Y
IS
6.50
(2.74)*
-1.95
(3.13)*
.85
(4.68)*
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* significant at 5% level
4.17
(3.49)*
-i;09
(2.56)*
.56
(5.17)*
9.02
(5.55)*
-2.36
(4.21)*
.44
(2.74)*
6.44
(4.55)*
-2.13
(4.62)*
.26
(1.81)*
6.18
(2.59)*
-1.84
(2.43)*
.40
(2.36)*
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disappointed In the results overall, we are pleased that the professional/
managerial slope was most negative. This occupation (together with farmers)
contains the greatest uncertainty of earning power.
Partial effects with respect to assets and school quality were also
computed- All of these^slopes were positive. We interpret this to imply
that increasing wealth and school quality induce young men to enter all five
occupations at the expense of farming. One of the asset slopes and three
out of five school quality slopes were statistically significant.
The set of 22 county dummy variables were jointly significant in each
of the five equations. Although not shown in Table I, the orderings of the
individual county dummies were quite consistent across occupational groups.
As one would expect, most young men enter nonagricultural occupations in the
suburban Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Montgomery, and Prince George's counties.
Young men are more likely to enter agriculture in the rural Garret, Kent,
and Queen Anne's counties.
We were concerned that our results may have been clouded by intercor-
relation between assets and school quality. Although having only a .714
correlation themselves, we feared that the seven interaction terms shown in
Table I might be causing some of the same problems that we experienced when
we entered so many skewness terms. In order to test this. Table II presents
regression results when the asset variable was deleted. The school quality
variable is deleted in Table III.
The results in Table II do not differ greatly from Table I's results.
The mean and variance slopes are very similar in magnitude and significance.
However, the slopes with respect to "IS" do increase in magnitude and
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significance, ^is appears to confirm that assets and school quality are
competing with each other for explanatory power. The "IS"* variable is
statistically significant in all five equations, rather than three as in
Table I.
The results in Table III are considerably better in the sense that the
variance slope has the expected negative sign and is significant all five
times* The slope with respect to mean income is positive and significant
all five times. This formulation provides clear support for the hypothesis
that variances (and uncertainty) do matter in occupational choices^ It is
less clear why we didn't get equally gpod results in Table li, if
collinearity between assets and school quality was the culprit* As a final
observation from Table III, we note that the slope with respect to assets
was significant four out of five times*
•The next step is ^o test the sensitivity of our results to the use of
our more sophisticated- occupational incCTie expectations data* These Hansen—
Sargent weighted average income series are substituted in Tables IV—VI for
the simple averages of Tables I-III. No other changes in the regressions
were introduced *
The results are very similar, although there is a slight deterioration
in terms of consistency of signs and statistical significance* Only five
out of the forty-six correct signs switched to an incorrect sign* In no
case (for Tables I-VI) was an incorrect sign statistically significanti In
Table VI, which controls only for assets, all slopes had the expected
signs a
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TABLE IV
Professionals
and
Clerical
and
Sales
Operatives
and
Laborers
(Pi-yp)
(IS)*(li^-Wp)
A*(y^-Hp)
(IS)*(Oj^-ap)
(IS)2*(a^-aj.)
A*( Op)
A2*(o^-ap)
(IS)*A*(a^-ap)
County Dummies
(F-statlstic)
Stsmnary statistics:
3Y
3Y
3Y
•3S
3Y
'Km
Craftsmen Service
.12. -1.60 .32 9.85 -3.92
(.06) (1.54) (.22) (2.45)* (1.21)
-.001 .008 .003 -.044 .024
(-12) (1.54) (.64) - (2.11)* (1.46)
. .53 .35 .26 .32 -.40
(1.76) (.94) (.81) (.20) (.32)
2.37 .75 1.58 .02 2.61
(1.75) (.94) (1.51) (.01) (2.69)*
-.013 -.002 -.004 .001 -.012
(1.51) (.36) (.58) (^08) (2.29)*
2.3x10"5 .5x10"^ -.2x10"^ .2x10"^ 1.9x10"^
(1.32) (.64) (.13) (.22) (2.05)*
-.198 -.44 -.66 -.28 -.35
' (.38) (1.58) (1.72) ( .51) (.93)
.088 .091 .046 .021 .081
(1.53) (3.19)* (1.13) (.66) (1.98)
-.0011 -.0004 .0012 .0004 -.0007
(.72) (.57) (1.23) (.46) (.86)
Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
(20.47)* (37.89)* (18.84)* (22.48)* (17.70)*
. .615 .716 .620 .631 .547
1.23 1.17 1.66 -.49 1.25
(1.06) (1.62) (1,92)* (.44) (1.09)
-.055 -.040 .026 .093 .10
(.18) (.23) (.11) (.38) (.36)
.59 .34 .32 .00 .38
, (1.96)* (1.82)* (1.33) (.00) (1.29)
-.0003 .0035 .0047 .0074 .0077
• (.07) (1.33) (1.24) (3.48)* (1.79)*
(t-statlstlcs In parentheses)
* significant at 5% level
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TABLE V
Professionals
and
Managers
Clerical
and
Sales Craftsmen
Operatives
and
Laborers Service
.77
. (.38)
-1.47
(1.42)
.38
(.27)
8.27
(2.16)*
-3.08
(:95)
(IS)*(yi-UF) .0003
(.74)
.011
, (2.95)*
.005
(1.43)
-.035
(2.82)*
.017
(1.47)
(a^- dp)" 1.98
(1.49)
.56
(.72)
1.66
(1-62)
.49
(.42)
2.16
(2.25)*
(IS)*(ai-0F) -.013
(1.86)
-.004
(1.17)
-.010
(1.98)
-.004
(.76)
-.013
(3.03)
(IS)2*(aj^-0p) 1.8x10"^
(1.76)
.8x10"^
(1.56)
1.4x10"^
(2.02)*
1.0x10"^
(1.79)
1.6x10'^
(3.06)*
County Dununles
(F-statlstic)
Inc.
X22.57)*
Inc.
(39.69)*
Inc.
(22.42)*
Inc.
(23.30)*
Inc.
(17.37)*
.609 .709 .615 .628 ,.538
Stunmary statistics:
3Y
ac Pp)
1.54
(1.34)
1.25
(1.74)*
1.60
(1.87)*
-.69
(.62)
4.36
(1.47)
. 3Y
»C a^- ap) -.11
(.39)
-.04
(.25)
.06
(.24)
.16
(.67)
. .05
(.18)
8Y
"5rw
.0035
( .81)
.0059
(2.53)*
.0072
(2.14)*
.0077
(4.17)*
.0091
(2.47)*
(t'statistlcs in parentheses)
*. significant at 5& level
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TABLE VI
Professionals
"• and
Managers
Clerical
and
Sales Craftsmen
Operatives
and
Laborers Service
i
T .92
(.77)
-.70
(.93)
1.92
(2.19)*
9.31
(4.13)*
-.09
(.04)
A*( Pi" Up) .AO
(1.60)
.75
(2.95)*
.35
(1.47)
-3.46
(4.16)*
.77
(.86)
.69
(1.32)
.66
(2.08)*
,.22
(.51)
-1.16
(2.22)*
1.13
(2.27)*
,A*(ai-ap) -.67
(2.12)*
-.56
(3.17)*
-.41
(1.69)
.28
(1.05)
-.86
(3.39)*
A^*( cr^-tJp) .10
(1.98)*
.09
(3.65)*
.07
(1.97)*
.02
(.75)
.11
(3.22)*
County Dummies
(F-statistlc)
Inc.
(21.59)*
Inc.
(38.90)*
Inc.
(19.37)*
Inc.
(21.63)*
Inc.
(17.60)*
• 612 .713 .616 .610 .540
Summary statistics:
aY
a(.
^ 1.87
(2.A1)*
1.09
(2.44)*
2.75
(5.30)*
1.10
(1.45)
1.74
(2.05)*
9Y
-.29
(2.37)*
-.10
(1.36)
-.32
(3-35)*
-.37
(3.27)*
-.20
(1.56)
3Y ..
"3S
.46
(1.79)*
.55
(3.67)*
.33
(1.64)
-26
(2.42)*
..74
(3.11)*
(t-statistlcs In parentheses)
* significant at 5% level
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in Tables I-III, thirty-one slope coefficients were significant at the
5% level. Introduction of the Hansen-Sargent series created a net loss of
nine significant slope coefficients. Despite this effect, eleven out of
fifteen coefficients remained statistically significant in Table VI.
- VI. Structural Estimation of the Occupational Choice Ifodel
Recall that equation (14) is:
(14) log(J^) =Y(Sq. + - («0n ^
n
2
'h ^ ^lihh * "^l ^
We assume that the have a raultivariate normal distribution with
uncorreiated disturbances across time and space. The covariance matrix is
specified as
E(eij.el,ti) = V for i=i', t==t'
« 0 otherwise
The log-likelihood function over T time periods, c counties and m
equations, is
. c c
(22) 2 logfL.(0)) = -(cmT/2)log(2TT) - (cm/2) E log det (V)
i-1 ^ i-1
1 ^
- (l/2)Tr(v'-^ I M.(e))
i=l
where M^(e) is the mby mmoment matrix of errors for the individual i equal
to ^£t^it' ^ vector of parameters (Y,» ^q» 5^, ^2 '^ » ^^id Vis the
related covariance matrix of the errors. Following Bard (1974), we maximize
(22) with respect to the unknown V to derive the maximum likelihood
estimator of Vi The resulting estimated covariance matrix has the form
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V - (1/Tc) I M/e)
i-1
Replacing V with V in (22) yields the concentrated likelihood function
n
(23) L(0) - -(iiiTc/2)(l + log(2Tr) - log(Tc)) - (cT/2)log [ 2 M(e)
i-1
(23) may be maximized with respect to the vector of parameters to obtain the
maximum likelihood estimates of the structural parameters.
The vector 9 can be specified in a number of ways. Since Y is positive
if occupational choice is subject to risk-averse behavior, we fix it to
equal .25. Other values of Y did not yield different values of the likeli
hood function, nor did they change the qualitative results for the other
parameters. Once Y is fixed, we can identify the remaining parameters.
Our least restrictive parameter vector is thus 0j^ = ^^Oi * ^li* ^2i^* *
i*- 1, 2, 6. Recall that 5^^ Is the constant, occupation i-specific
level of human capital, is the occupation i-specific level of human
capital prodution parameter for school quality, and is the occupation i-
specific production parameter for family assets. To test if school quality
and family assets have occupation-specific effects on human capital, we
consider two subsets of 6^, 6^ = t^oi* ^1' *^21 '^ ~ ^^Oi* ^li' ^2 '^*
i= 1, 2, ..., 6. The first restricts that school quality have the same
productivity across all occupations, and the second restricts that family
assets have the same productivity across all occupations. Letting L(*) be
the likelihood value for the relevant parameter vector, 2[l(6j^) - L( 62) ) and
2(L(0p - L(62)) will both be distributed chi-square with five degrees of
freedom.
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The maximum likelihood estimation was performed using the GQ0PT2
program. The results from the least restrictive parameter set are
contained in Table VII. Most of the production parameters are positive,
indicating that school quality and assets are productive in producing
occupation-specific human capital. The exception is in the farming occupa
tion, *^ere both family assets and school quality reduce human capital, and
the professional occupation where school quality is unproductive. School
quality is most productive for the operative occupation, followed by the
craft, service and clerical occupations. Family assets are most productive
for the service occupation, followed by the operative, clerical,
professional and craft occupations. The null hypotheses that either school
quality or family assets did not enter into the human capital production
21
process were rejected at the .003 level of confidence.
Table VIII contains the results from the restricted parameter vectors
©2 and BJ. The results are quite similar to those of Table VII, with the
exception that only one production paroneter, the effect of school quality
in the farming occupation, remains negative. This result leads to the
speculation that the negative signs in Table VII may result from the
multicollinearity problems discussed above.
The estimated coefficients in Table VIII are quite similar across the
two equations. The school quality and family asset equations have nearly
identical effects. In both systems himian capital inputs are most important
in the service, craft, clerical and operative occupations with smaller
effects in the professional occupation.
To test if school quality and family assets have occupation-specific
effects as well as general effects, we compare the likelihood values in
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TABLE VII
Maxlmuin likelihood estimates of the parameter vector 6]^
«0 professional -4.00
operative -10.26
clerical -3.93
«0 craft -4.41
^0 service -9.64
farming 1.88
6 professional -.556
6 operative 1.222
6 clerical .466
6 craft .776
6 service .660
6 farming -.310
professional 2.802
operative 3.157
clerical 2.966
craft 2.383
service 4.881
«2 farming -.6834
y* .25
L(0 ) -2954.299
is restricted to be .25 and is-not estimated.
Maximum likelihood estimates
of parameter vector 62
35
TABLE VIII
Maximum likelihood estiniates
of parameter vector 0^
professional -5.A43 professional -4.731
operative -10.08 operative -10.445
clerical -4.851 ^0 clerical -4.536
craft -4.878 craft -4.753
6q service -11.219 service -9.249
farming ' 1.947 farming .0495
6 professional 1,078 professional 2-285
6. operative 3.677 operative 4.156
6 clerical 2.994 «2 clerical 3.378
6. craft 2.552 «2 craft 3.033
6, service 5.177 «2 service 5.099
6. farming -.855 «2 farming .738
^2 .205
.092
Y* .25 Y .25
L( 62) -2966.843 L( ej) -2964.005
*Y is restricted to •25 and is not estimated.
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Table VIII with that of Table VII. The critical value of the test at the
.005 level of confidence is X^(5) = 16.75. The null hypothesis that family
assets are equally productive across all occupations Is rejected
(2(L(6^) - L(02)) =' 19.4). This result supports the conjecture that schools
and family inputs may have specific as well as general training effects.
VI. Concluding Comments
The results are extremely promising. In particular, it seems apparent
that this model successfully captures occupational choice behavior in a
human capital framework where the valuation of hiraian capital is uncertain.
It also appears that, by placing structure on the human capital production
process, we can draw inferences about the effect of school quality or family
asset differences on occupational choice. Finally, by deriving the logit
specification explicitly from a structural model, we are able to interpret
our parameter estimates from this logit specification.
This model can be applied to a number of other applications involving
human capital investment choices under uncertainty. In particular,
migration and job turnover behavior would appear to be similar to the
occupational choice behavior modeled herein.
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Footnotes
dU,
d(h*W^J
=TS^exp[-Yh*W^ ) >0
d(hXi)'
=-^^B^exp(-Yh*W2^) <0.
r 1 dU^ -1
= Y, which is the measure of absolute risk
aversion. See Arrow (1970) for an introduction to the theory of risk
aversion.
The individual's earnings per unit of human capital are not known with
certainty, since the number of hours worked in period 2 is uncertain. This
uncertainty becomes unimportant under two circumstances. First, if h^ is
zero, zero, and expected utility will vary across occupations
solely on the basis of the taste parameter . Second, as Y* approaches
infinity, exp(-Yh*W -Y*) approaches zero, and once again expected utility
will vary across occupations solely on the basis of taste. Therefore, taste
will dictate choice of occupation to the greatest extent for either the
least educated or the most wealthy segments of the population.
3
Because utility is ordinal rather than cardinal, we can expand the
Taylor series about any point, -Yhj^. If e[U2£] > i >evaluated at'
a point -Yhj, then e(u2£] >E(U2j) evaluated at any point [-YhJ^) * [-Yhj^).
We are implicitly assuming that whatever the distribution of the wage
per unit of human capital in occupation 1, the distribution is such that it
has a moment generating function.
4 . ...
Although our economic agent observes all moments of the distribution,
in practice, the econometrician may only observe some finite number of these
moments. Thus, the econometrician can only approximate the agent's expected
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utility with error. We assume that this approximation error is random
across time and space.
^For"^ a description of the properties of the Weibull distribution, see
Domencich and McFadden (1975).
^in fact, hj^ can be specified as log[hj^^} or exp(hj^), so long as the
measure of human capital is linear in the parameters of the production
function.
^See, for example, Hogg and Craig (1970), p. 80,
Q*
This assumption allows us to introduce the expected future path of the
distribution of earnings per unit of human capital into the occupational
choice decision. Thus, expected future moments are included as well as
current moments.
^We found that most of the time paths of the first and second moments
were characterized by second-order autoregressive processes. Thus, the
values for u and c converge to
"2 "2
ex D
1 2^
K 2~ ^t-12 l-pOj^-p 1-poij^-P O2
1 '^ 2"
27- 2. Vl"2 l-pfij-p '^s^ 1-P«^.-P S
2
as T gets very large.
^^The anihilation operator restricts the powers of L to be positive.
seventh category in the published data is titled "Protective Service
Workers Including Armed Forces." A substantial number of young men are in
this classification, especially during the Korean War years and the late
1950s. Some decline in the early 1960s and a rise in the late 1960s
suggests that variation in this category is largely exogenous, changing with
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national defense requirements and draft calls. Hence, we exclude these men
from our data set. Our employed population is best interpreted as the
employed civilian population.
alternative measure was computed dividing by the number "attending"
rather than "belonging". The two proxies had a correlation of .996 and made
little difference in our results.
'•^The data relate to total income from all sources of males age 14 and
over having some work experience during the calendar year. Some small but
unavoidable distortion in the distribution of sales, service, and agricul
tural incomes (occupations where teens are concentrated) may result from the
inclusion of teenagers working part-year and part-time.
^^Midpoints of each interval were used in conjunction with the interval
frequencies. The open-ended upper tail interval of those earning more thah
$25,000 was set at $30,000 throughout the period. Although this may
slightly bias down the estimated moments, any error is believed to be minor
in that such a small proportion of men earned more than $25,000 during this
period. Fortunately, the other published intervals were highly consistent
1951-1970. All moments were estimated in nominal terms and then adjusted
for the price level.
^^Data on educational attainment is available for 1952, 1957, 1959,
1962, and 1964-1970 on a consistent basis for males 18 years of age and
older. Moments of the distribution for missing years were estimated by
interpolation, which should be reasonable since the distributions only
change slowly.
^^This procedure was not feasible for adjusting the skewness of incomes.
Unfortunately, our measure of educational skewaess (defined as two times
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mean minus median divided by the standard deviation) was almost always nega
tive so that we could not take logarithms. In those cases, some alternative
regression methods-were attempted, although this point becomes minor in that
skewness was later dropped from the analysis.
17 ,Somewhat more formally, if y = r sna
-2 h
(i) In u = In, + In , then assuming that human capital is
^2' 2 ^2
composed of two components, age (G) and schooling (S) as
follows:
(ii) h = Tg'^ S^, Y, a, 3 parameters. Taking expected values (assuming
G is a constant),
(iii) = E(h) = E(tg"s^) = tG®E(S^) taking logarithms,
(iv) In = Iti YG** + In [ECS^)]
= In Yg" = 0 In [E(S)]
= a + e In [Mg]
and substituting (iv) into (i), we get
(v) In y , = a + 0 In [M ] + e
. "2* ''w
where e = In W2.
'•^To be precise, the 1959 and 1969 values were set at the Census of
Population "relatives" and a trend line was computed by interpolation. The
"non—trending" index values were then multiplied by this trend line in order
to obtain values for the intermediate years. One complication was that only
5 income intervals were provided in the 1970 census data, whereas 11
intervals were published in 1960. In order to compute trends, we aggregated
the 1960 data into 5 (comparable) income intervals so as to minimize any
estimation bias due to this effect.
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^^Although the non—trended series was used, some of the series (farmers,
in particular) exhibited a trending pattern. As a result, time and time
squared were included in the autocorrelation regressions.
^^Three observations were deleted because there were zero farmers/farm
laborers, and we could not divide by zero in constructing the dependent
variable.
21 2The critical value at the .005 level of confidence is x (6) - 18.6.
The test statistic obtained by restricting - 0 for all i was 19.5. The
test statistic obtained by restricting ® ^ 27.9.
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TABLE A-1
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean
Dependent Variables: Log (X^^/Farmers)
Professionals/Managers (LP)
Clerical/Sales (LC)
Craftsmen (LE)
Operatives/Laborers (LO)
Service Workers (LS)
-2.3088
.08997
-.67780
.77178
-1.55554
Mean of Income Distribution: - Wp)
Professionals/Managers
Clerical/Sales
Craftsmen
Operatives/Laborers
Service Workers
.46008
.21273
.21455
.09381
-.02275
Variance of Income Distribution: (.a^ - Op)
Professionals/Managers
Clerical/Sales
Craftsmen
Operatives/Laborers
Service Workers
Assets (A)
School Quality (IS)
.40187
-.13959
-.29643
-.34357
-.31235
2.37396
253.47299
Variance
4.0456
1.9180
2.5174
1.6744
3.2216
.00639
.00409
.00558
.00485
.00587
.08934
.04339
.06301
.06605
.05872
.62128
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TABLE A-3
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
A ^ P?
A 1.0 .98 .92
A^ 1.0 .98
A^ 1.0
IS
IS^
IS^
A(IS)
A(IS)^
2
IS (IS)^ (IS)^ A(IS) A(IS)^ a\is)
.71 .70 .68 .93 .84 .92
.71 .71 .70 .94 .87 .96
.67 .69 .69 .91 .87 .97
-0 .99 .96 .90 .92 .81
1.0 .99 .90 .94 .83
1.0 .90 .95 .84
1.0 .98 .98
1.0 .96
A (IS)
1.225
1. 2v
1,175
l'.15
1.125
1.1 .
1.075
1.05
1.025
1.0
.975
;95
.925
.90
.875
.85
.825
.80
.775
.75
.725
.70
.675
.65
.625
.60
.•515
.55
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.50
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.40
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.35
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.30
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.25
.225
.20
.175
.15
.125
.10
.075
.05
.025
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FIGURE 1
INCOME MEANS
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FIGURE 2
INCOME' VARIANCE
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